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Dialogue
'Innocence"-A Dialogue with
Professor Sundby
by
Louis B. SCHWARTZ*
In his scholarly, sensitive, and provocative article, The Reasonable
Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, I my colleague Professor Scott
Sundby analyzes the presumption of innocence and argues that it is the
premise for the constitutional requirement that criminal guilt be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott concludes, contrary to Patterson v.
New York, 2 that a state is powerless to shift to the defendant in a murder
case the burden of proving an affirmative defense such as "severe emo-
tional distress."
According to Scott, it denies due process to shift to the defendant
the burden of proof on any "fact that bears on the individual's guilt and
punishment under the legislative scheme," including elements of the
crime, defenses, and mitigating factors.3 Scott rejects "restricted
proceduralism" that would extend the presumption of innocence only to
"those facts that the legislature has labeled as elements of the crime."'4
He denounces the idea that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt could be circumvented by redefining a crime to remove a trouble-
some element of the offense, leaving only the easily provable elements.
Such legislative game playing, he believes, would allow the state to play
hob with the constitutional right not to be convicted when innocent. But
Scott also rejects, after thorough and mostly approving consideration,
the alternative "substantive approach" that would lodge in the Supreme
Court the power and obligation to determine which elements of an of-
fense as defined by a state legislature were constitutionally essential to
* Professor of Law, Univeristy of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457 (1989).
2. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
3. Sundby, supra note 1, at 488; cf id. at 467 ("all facts relevant to punishment").
4. Id. at 466.
establish guilt. This approach would require the Court to produce a con-
stitutional definition of the state of innocence to be protected by the pre-
sumption and proof beyond reasonable doubt. Scott prudently draws
back at this prospect of federalized standardization of offenses, justifica-
tions, excuses, culpability, responsibility, and so on. He ends up advocat-
ing the theory he calls "expansive proceduralism." 5
Scott proposes that the relevant state penal statute should be ana-
lyzed to determine what state of innocence the legislature recognized
through its choice of elements of the offense and prescription of de-
fenses. 6 This state of innocence then must be protected by requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, a state legislature that
makes self-defense a justification for homicide could not put the burden
of proving self-defense on the defendant. The defendant is innocent until
the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not commit the
homicide in self-defense. This result, however, runs counter to Martin v.
Ohio,7 when the Supreme Court upheld Ohio's rule that self-defense
must be established by the defendant. Scott condemns this as "restrictive
proceduralism: an individual is now serving a sentence for murder even
though it may be as likely or not that she acted in a justifiable and blame-
less fashion." 8
A. The Meaning of Innocence
Agreeing as I do with so much of Scott's article and with his con-
demnation of the result in Martin v. Ohio, I nevertheless want to warn
against adopting some of his concepts, notably his idea of innocence. As
used in the article, the term is intolerably vague and misleading, espe-
cially when associated with jury verdicts. It oversimplifies trial to iden-
tify acquittal with innocence, or to posit "accuracy" of the trial verdict as
the paramount goal of the proceedings. Defendants are acquitted for
many reasons, the least likely being innocence. A defendant may be ac-
quitted even though almost every member of the jury is satisfied of his
guilt if even one juror harbors a lingering doubt. A defendant may be
acquitted if critical evidence of his guilt is inadmissable because the po-
lice violated the Constitution in obtaining that evidence by unlawful
search or coercive interrogation. A defendant also may be acquitted if he
proves that the police entrapped him into committing the offense. In
5. Id. at 487-505.
6. Id. at 505-06.
7. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
8. Sundby, supra note 1, at 458.
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short, criminal trials often turn out to be trials of the government as well
as the defendant-and properly so.
More remarkable is the spectacle of jury acquittal because the jury
sympathizes with the defendant even though guilt clearly has been
proven by the evidence according to the law set forth in the judge's in-
structions. This was the case in the recent prosection of Lt. Col. Oliver
North. The jury convicted him of three felonies involved in the cover-up
of his earlier activities, but acquitted him of nine counts growing out of
the activities themselves, unlawfully diverting funds to support the Nica-
raguan Contras. One can only guess at explanations, but most likely the
jury believed North was merely a tool of higher-ups who were "getting
off" and leaving North in the position of "fall guy" as he claimed. Simi-
lar instances of jury nullification are found in the notorious "unwritten
law" pursuant to which juries acquit a betrayed spouse charged with
murdering the paramour, although the law and the evidence very clearly
call for a manslaughter conviction.
It is important to preserve the distinction between acquittal and in-
nocence, which is regularly obfuscated in news media headlines. When
acquittal is interpreted as a finding of innocence, the public is led to be-
lieve that a guiltless person has been prosecuted for political or corrupt
reasons. As a result, well justified prosecutions of powerful figures might
be deterred.
B. The Independent Role of the Presumption of Innocence Distinct From
the Reasonable Doubt Rule
The real import of the presumption of innocence is that conviction
must rest solely on evidence produced at the trial, notwithstanding
Supreme Court dicta linking the presumption to the constitutional re-
quirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.9 The trier of fact, whether
court or jury, must not be influenced by the fact that prior to trial a
number of officials, including the arresting officer, the committing magis-
trate, and the bail judge, already have found the evidence persuasive
against the defendant. To give meaning to the presumption, the judge
should tell the jury (or remind herself if this is a bench trial) that guilt
must be proven solely by the evidence produced at trial.10
9. Id.
10. Compare the refusal of a judge to permit members of the Attorney General's Special
Strike Force Against Organized Crime to identify themselves as such while prosecuting organ-
ized crime offenses.
November 1989]
A recent article by Professor George F. Fletcher, I I discussing the
struggle to incorporate the presumption of innocence into the penal law
of the U.S.S.R., highlights the importance of this concept of the pre-
sumption. In the Soviet Union, the "procuracy" (prosecutor's office)
makes a documented preliminary judgment of guilt. According to
Fletcher, those resisting the adoption of the presumption of innocence
view the presumption as "incompatible with the reliance on the
procuracy's judgment-the trial might actually give the defendant a rea-
sonable chance in court."1 2 The Fletcher account clearly demonstrates
that the presumption of innocence is independent of the rule requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Soviets have long subscribed to a
version of the reasonable doubt rule without presuming innocence. 13 Fi-
nally, the discontinuity between the presumption of innocence and proof
beyond reasonable doubt is demonstrated by the fact that there is no
intellectual dissonance in conceiving a system in which the presumption
might coexist with a requirement of proof merely by preponderance of
the evidence.
C. The Feasibility of a Constitutional Requirement of Proof Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
Lastly, I want to consider the feasibility of Scott's proposed rule that
would constitutionally require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
"every fact that bears on the individual's guilt and punishment."' 4 This
rule would necessitate revolutionary changes in existing constitutional
and criminal law with little gain in justice or expediency. If adopted, the
rule's chief effect would be to change the odds against convicting the
innocent from the traditional ten to one ("better that ten guilty go free
than that one innocent suffer") 15 to closer to one hundred to one. Scott
believes "injustice" is done when the guilty avoid conviction 16 and that a
balance of injustices must be struck. He repudiates any suggestion that
the burden of proof should be beyond all possible doubt or that society
could tolerate a one million to one ratio of unjust acquittals.' 7 Yet if
every accused has a constitutional right not to be punished when inno-
11. G. Fletcher, In Gorbachev's Courts, N. Y. Rev. of Books, May 18, 1989, 13, at 15-16.
12. Id. at 14.
13. HAZARD, BUTLER & MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAl SYSTEM 57 (1984).
14. Sundby, supra note 1, at 488, 495-505.
15. Id. at 460.
16. Id. I have a different view of "justice." See Schwartz, Justice, Expediency. and
Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1987). For me, justice is done when a defendant is acquitted
pursuant to society's insistence on restraining lawless actions of police and prosecution.
17. Sundby, supra note 1, at 460-61.
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cent, it surely makes no sense to add "unless the state's interest in effec-
tive law enforcement requires that constitutional right to be abridged."
Questions immediately arise, such as: "How far may this right be
abridged?" and "How long must a conviction remain vulnerable to col-
lateral attack by the putatively innocent convict?"
D. A Proposed Rule-Strict Scrutiny
I submit there is no constitutional right to have innocence always
and certainly vindicated (an impossible aspiration in a society conducted
by fallible human beings), but only a right to procedural safeguards that
will command judicial and popular respect for verdicts. Perhaps I am
being a naughty "expansive proceduralist" or a naughty exponent of
"natural law," but I see no escape from a pragmatic approach to ques-
tions of punishability, permitting the Supreme Court to invalidate legisla-
tion and procedures that are arbitrary, incompatible with civilized
respect for the individual, and shock the conscience of the Court.
I propose a "strict scrutiny" test. My test would not mechanically
accept state legislatures manipulating the elements of an offense to avoid
the requirement of proving culpability beyond reasonable doubt. I would
not uphold definitions of felonies or other infamous crimes merely be-
cause a rational legislator might have so balanced the conflicting pres-
sures. Under a strict scrutiny standard, I, like Scott, would repudiate
Martin v. Ohio. It is totally at odds with modem American sensibility
that we should tolerate conviction in a self-defense case without proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in reasonable
self-defense. This is not because the state has designated self-defense an
issue of guilt or innocence, but because justified self-defense is admirable
behavior, which it would be outrageous to penalize.' 8
The same cannot be said of "excusable self-defense" when the judg-
ment as to the need to resort to lethal measures was erroneous. For rea-
sons of penal policy rather than federal Constitutional law, I would
certainly mitigate to manslaughter in cases of unreasonable resort to
needless lethal self-defense. By the same token I would repudiate United
States v. Balint, 19 which would permit conviction of a druggist for feloni-
18. Yet even in this extreme case, one must avoid dogmatism. Our ancestors were not
totally irrational in treating self-defense as mitigating rather than exculpating. They saw that
self-defense is invariably invoked by the survivor, without the possibility of contradiction by the
deceased; that such issues as who was the initial "aggressor?" and "did he break off the engage-
ment?" and "was he responding to excessive force?" hardly lent themselves to beyond-reason-
able-doubt resolutions. Remitting the problems to the less formal post-conviction stage must
have appeared quite reasonable to Anglo-Norman judges bent on suppressing violence.
19. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
November 1989]
ous possession of an administratively designated drug whether or not the
accused knew or had reasonable opportunity to know that the drug was
present in a patent medicine on his shelf. I would repudiate United
States v. Park, 20 which convicted the president of a vast grocery chain for
rodent exposure in a remote warehouse, merely on the basis that he ad-
mitted overall responsibility for every aspect of the corporation's opera-
tions; I would require a substantial dereliction in his supervisory
behavior.
By way of illustration, there are areas in which any "strict scrutiny"
rule would tolerate some conviction of the "innocent." Three categories
comprise most of the cases: (1) minor regulatory offenses not regarded as
immoral or infamous, carrying very low penalties, and occurring in such
circumstances or with such frequency that enforcement would be sub-
stantially obstructed by requiring proof of culpability beyond reasonable
doubt; (2) defenses requiring impracticable assessments of impaired voli-
tion, absent generally recognized mental illness; (3) defenses of a jurisdic-
tional character, for example, those challenging the competence of the
court rather than the issue whether the defendant engaged in the repre-
hensible behavior. 2 1
It is, of course, horn book law that the legislature may eliminate
mens rea as an element of regulatory offenses. In this area, we are all
restrictive proceduralists. But a strict scrutiny approach to such legisla-
tion should lead to refinement of the doctrine and consideration of alter-
native solutions to enforcement problems. 22 Thus, imprisonment, even
for short terms, might be precluded for first and unwitting offenders.
Quite short terms might be allowable when the regulatory violation actu-
ally entailed a criminally negligent disregard of a substantial risk of the
harm against which the regulation was directed. Repeated flouting of
regulations could carry misdemeanor sanctions.
The impaired volition cases require us to compromise our aversion
to convicting the innocent mainly because of agonizing doubts about the
abilities of experts to distinguish reliably among subtle shades of individ-
20. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987); People
v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (1980) (burden shifted to defendant on issue of
"extreme emotional disturbance"); Regina v. Sault Ste. Marie, 85 D.L.R. 3d 161 (Supreme
Court of Canada 1978) ("Open to the accused to avoid liability by proving that he took all
reasonable care").
21. Scott concedes a necessary "exception" for this third category. Sundby, supra note 1,
at 506 n.178.
22. Such an alternative solution was embodied in the proposed Reform of the Federal
Criminal Code. National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Code, Study Draft
§ 1006 (1970).
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ual impairment absent gross mental disease. If expert testimony on the
issue of impaired volition is unreliable, the result will be haphazard con-
victions and acquittals, more rather than less injustice. Economic ine-
qualities that would deny poor defendants access to expert testimony
increases the likelihood of injustice. There has been violent controversy
in recent decades over the extent, if at all, that impaired volition should
be accepted as an excuse or mitigation in the determination of guilt. Af-
ter brief judicial flirtations with the more liberal Model Penal Code for-
mulation, California and federal legislators have reverted to M'Naghten
Rules, excluding volitional defenses even in conjunction with mental ill-
ness. 23 Diminished responsibility, a doctrine that gives mitigating effect
to mental abnormalities less severe than exculpating insanity, has sus-
tained similar reverses.
This treatment of impaired volition defenses has been backed by the
American Psychiatric Association, as well as the American Bar Associa-
tion.24 The ABA explicitly recommended that jurisdictions retaining
a volitional test should put the burden of proof upon the defendant. In
the face of these manifestations of dubiety, it would be a bold legalist
who would opine that the Constitution makes volitional impairment
equivalent to innocence, requiring disproof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The impaired volition cases highlight a crucial feature of our convic-
tion/punishment system overlooked by Scott. Our system makes a radi-
cal distinction between the procedures for proving the commission of the
offense and the much less formal procedures for sentencing. Only the
former procedure provides such safeguards as the presumption of inno-
cence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, exclusion of hearsay testimony,
and jury trial. That is as it should be, for conviction is the basic determi-
nation that the defendant has forfeited his freedom and subjected himself
to dispositions society makes for its own protection.. Sentencing is an
altogether different matter. Unreviewable discretion by the trial judge is
only beginning to be constrained by the growing movement towards sen-
tencing guidelines.25 Examination of these guidelines or presentence re-
ports available to sentencing judges, reveals the remarkably wide range of
factual issues that enter into post-conviction determinations, including:
23. § 402 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (West
Supp. 1989) (even "severe" mental illness), overriding decisions like United States v. Brauner,
471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1988) (voter initiative of
1982, overriding decisions like People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333 (1978)).
24. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1(a) (1989).
25. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (West 1988): constitutionality sustained in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647
(1989).
November 1989]
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motive of pecuniary gain; exceptional depravity; defendant's belief that
he had a moral justification; youth; domination of an other person; edu-
cation and criminal history of the convict; and restitution or remorse.26
For present purposes, two conclusions emerge. First, a legislative
choice to eliminate a culpability element from the definition of an offense
does not mean that culpability is being ignored. It means only that the
particular culpability issue is to be weighed at a different stage and in a
different manner: by the district attorney, perhaps, in exercising her
prosecutorial discretion, by the sentencing judge, by the parole board, or
by executive clemency. The second justifiable conclusion is that the mul-
titude of factual issues presented in discretionary sentencing could not
possibly be disposed of on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Surely, Scott overstates his position when he declares, to the contrary,
that whenever the state uses a fact "to justify a particular criminal sanc-
tion," the reasonable doubt rule is constitutionally applicable. 27
Two recent cases show that the question as to the proper stage of
criminal proceedings when issues affecting punishability should be con-
sidered-and the associated question whether there must be proof be-
yond reasonable doubt-are headed for the Supreme Court. United
States v. Scroggins 28 held that in sentencing on a count to which defend-
ant had pleaded guilty, the judge may consider defendant's behavior cov-
ered by counts dropped pursuant to a plea bargain, i.e., the decision
espouses the "real offense" approach to sentencing. 29 The court treated
evidence of eighteen prior thefts as showing that the theft to which he
pleaded guilty was part of a pattern manifesting greater culpability than
would an isolated occurrence. Accordingly, restitution for all the thefts
could be required. In United States v. Davis,30 a district judge held guide-
line sentencing unconstitutional when it turns on facts not proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, e.g., facts related to the amount of drugs
involved and the "leadership" role of defendant in the transaction. Is it
too early to start counting heads on the Supreme Court?
26. See list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6(3), (4); list of special circumstances qualifying for death penalty, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2 (West 1988).
27. Sundby, supra note 1, at 465.
28. 880 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1989).
29. See Schwartz, Options in Constructing a Sentencing System, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 680
et seq. (arguing in favor of real offense sentencing). The Model Penal Code unhesitantly shifts
the burden of proof affecting penalties, e.g., § 210.2(l)(b) ("presumption" of recklessness in
felony murder); § 223.1(2)(b) (burden of proof on defendant to show amount involved in theft
is less than $50).
30. 715 F. Supp. 1473 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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